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EAST  WEST  SHIPPING 
Speech  to  be  delivered  at  International  Business  Center 
of  New  England  i~? Boston,  on_  _  February  2 ,,  1978  by  Richard  BURKE 
Member  of  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities 
My  last port  of  call,  if one  may  use  that  expression,  beforeyour 
country  was  Copenhagen,  where  I  had  spent  two  days  in  close 
discussion  with  the  Danish  administration  about  the  shape  of 
our  work  programme  in  the  next  six months,  a  period  in  which 
Denmark  carries responsibility  for  the  managment  of  the 
European  Communities  affairs.  Clearly  we  spoke  of  many  matters. 
&Jt  in  the  mar i ti'me  domain  two  issues  dominated  our  discussions,' 
One  was  an  important  but  purely  internal  issue  relating  to 
the  use  of  our  canals,  our  internal  waterways,  significant 
stuff but  for  internal  consumption.  The  other  was  more 
far  reaching  and  indeed  more  fundemental  i~ its significunce 
and  its potential  impact.  It relates  to  the  actions  which  must 
be  taken  if our  shipping  lines  are  to  be  protected  from 
exploitative  action  by  the  so  called state trading  countries 
of  Eastern  Europe. 
East-Uest  Prohlems  in  Shipping_  ...  ·: 
I  should  like  to  make  a  few  remar~s about  how  we  in  the 
Commission  cf  the  European  Communities  se~  the  problem  of 
competition  in  cargo  liner  shipping  from  certain  state-trading 
countries,  in  particular the  Soviet  Union.  This  is,  of  course, 
'  ,_ 
' 
•  I 
I 
' 
,· 
' 
'  •  I  •  • 
,_ 
>  , 
i: 
t 
a  problem  whose  effects  are  felt  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic; t 
I  the  United States  and  tl.e  Ccmmuni ty  have  a  cornmon  interest 
in  tackling it. 
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'  T he  Ei n v i e t  U  n i  CJ n : s  r.-: e r c h G n i;  ::J h  ~  p fJ in  g  f l e E t  has  b e En  2 x  fJ rJn r.: l r; ;::;  f. 
•  rep  :l d 1 y  since  the  e H r 1 y  19 70s •  Tf1 e  Soviets  now  h a v  e  the  s j_ x t  :-,  ~ 
largest  merchant  flBet  in  the  world,  and  have  already  overtaken t 
the  United  States,  which  ranks  eighth.  The  emphasis  lies  clearl~ on  general  cargo  ships,  where  the  Soviet  Union  has  been 
number  one  since  1974.  Half  its fleet  consists  of  gen~ral 
cargo  ships.  The  Soviet  Union  itself generates  only  about 
1.6 % of  internal  seaborne  trade  in  general  cargo,  but  it 
has  a  carrying  capacity  of  five  and  a  half  times  as  much. 
Thus  Russian  ~ompetition has  made  itself  mo~t felt  in  the 
liner trades.  In  a  period  of  only  five  years,  from  1970 
to  1975,  the  USSR  doubled  its deep  sea  liner  c&rryings 
from  4  million  to  over  8  million  tons.  In  comparison, 
world  seaborne  trade  grew  by  only  about  one  third  during 
that period. 
The  Soviet  fleet  expansion  wave  shows  no  signs  of 
abating  yet.  According  to  Russian  sources  it is  planned 
to  add,  during  the  current  five  year  plan  which  will  be 
completed  in  1980,  one  million  deadweight  tons  to  the 
merchant  fleet.  Most  6f  this  tonnage  will  be  highly 
specialised roll-on roll-off,  Lash  and  container  vessels. 
These  ships  arc  clearly  dnnignrd  to  capture  a 
significant  share  of  the  lucrative  western  trunGpurt 
m21rkets,  since  the  nature  of  Russian  exports  and  iiilports 
does  not require  suri~ sophisticated  transport  technology. • 
•. 
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The  rapid  growth  of  the  Russian  fleet  and  of its carryings 
means  that  somebody  has  to  give  way  to  allow  the  Russians 
a-larger slice.of the  cake.  The  statistics  show 
clearly  that  US,  EEC  and  Japanese  shipping  companies 
have  suffered  most  from  Russian  competition.  In  the  bila-
teral liner trades  between  western  and  state-trading 
countries,  Ru3sia  and  its COMECON  partners  have  managed 
to  establish virtual  monopolies.  There  they  cont~ol  up 
to  95  % of  the  market.  In  the  cross-trades  with  third 
countries  their  competition  methods  are  hitting  the 
established  liner  conferences  hard.  For  instance,  it is 
estimated  that  in  the  North  Atlantic  trades  USSR  ships 
•  alone,  operating  outside  the  liner  conferences,  already 
carry  28  % eastbound  and  25  % westbound  of  the  traffic 
volume  carried  by  the  conferences.  It is also  estimated 
that  COMECON  liners  have  captured  about  35  % of  the 
comparable  conference  cargo  transported  between  Northern 
Europe  and  the  Mediterranean,  25  % between  Northern  Europe 
and  the  West  Coast  of South  America,  over  20  % between 
Gulf  of  Mexico  ports  and  the  Mediterranean,  about 
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2ocfo  in the Europe-East Africa ·traffic and 12%  betvteen Japan and the \-Jest 
Coa3t of the United States.  Add  to this that the  Transsiberian Railway 
siphons off about  15%  of the East -Asia-Europe traffic.  ~lliat  r.1akcs  the 
situation even  Horse is that Soviet vessels are often able to  ski.m  off 
the  crca~ of high-rated traffic and  leave western  companies with the 8craps 
Faced with this situation t~e  are tempted to ask:  First,  t-rhat 
motivated the Soviet Union to  step up  its activities in mercha"lt  shipping 
so significantly?  Second,  t-;hat  mnkes  it so  successful'?  And  finally, 
why  should t4e  be  concerned about  it?  I  don't think that the first 
quest  ion can  simply be  a.ns\.,rered  \-lith  a  statement  1 ike they t-mnt  to  ;nr  .. ke  money,  , 
just like everybody else.  Certainly,  they also Hant  to  make  money  but 
I 
this objective neccls to be  seen  ag2.inst  the backgrotnid of the overall  oco1~o::iic~ 
and  other policy objectives of the state. This  is -:·;hn.t  makes  a  Soviet  :.:ldp;>i•1;  . 
company  so different from  a  western one:  like all other economic  Gctiv.i.ti8~, 
the J.1Crchant  murbe is an  instrurrwnt of the ctate for achieving its pol it  :Lc~·.l 
and overall  economic objectives,  \·there('!S  a  \.;estern  company  in fulfillhg 
its transport functions -v:ants,  'in  competition with others,  to  i·wrk  as 
profitably as possible in a  private enterprise  system.  Undoubtedly,  the 
uSSR-mcrcht>t:t  m2.rine  fulfils the role of a  re£cr·'JC  f10ct  for militCLry 
tr<mr.port  purpone:::;.  This 1'ccame  clea.r·  during  th~ Cuba  cr:i sir;,  during the 
Vietr!am Har  and  Dgain  during tho .Angolc..  \Hlr.  l!.an~r of the mcrchr.nt  r;hi1J<~ 
c.re  equ) pped t-ri th  clcctrm1l.c  ar:d  .:)ther  r:ophiot icatcd  gen.r,  far in  excess 
of normal  com:-nerciul  requir<:'!ilents.  l~aval officorn  und  crm.,..  are  k:no~m to 
serve also  in the  morc~:rmt marine  and  crm:c;  arc largely interch::.:1:::on.1J1<:. 
I  \·:ill  r.ot  say more  nm·:  a1:out  the  striJ:tcg:i.caspect  of th:is  quc~Jtion,  since it 
is not directly a  matter for the Europenn  Corr:::lissior..  But  it clcn.rly needs 
to be taken  into  01ccount  in v:ny  overall a::;scssment  of the situation. 
Another  rca.r-:o~  for the Soviet :::erchant  !:J~trine  baild-up  1·ws  the 
realisation in the  sixticl:l that  the USSTI  <.l:~pCr.t(1crl  too much  on  !iOn-COI.:J.CC()?T  (·  ,,, 
I  :::1;.ippine- services for its .::xports  and  irr.ports.  This  \la~~  cou~J.cd •·:i-th  rm  l· 
L 
a.wnrcnc>ss  that  a  gre2.ter  economic  1 i:·Jc-tip  -..ias  needed  ~vi th t·ro:;tcrn  ~  ,, 
• 
imluntrialiscd cou.ntries  in order to acti.eve the  a11"bitious  econo:'!lic  ol:jcc~  h·e~  ~ 
t~·cuno::;ic  fur:ct io!l 
substitution - uiwing ut  the tran:::po1·t 
shore of the nationn.l  fore:ien  traclc  - nnd of export  divercific<?~tion  -throu;':'~: 
the export  of zhippinc service;::;.  Ir,  :Car>~~crn  JX.rope  they call it the 
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primary economic motive of the current  phase of fleet expansion. 
After all, Soviet foreign trade must  expand  in order to pay 
for the rapidly growing  imports of \~estern technoloeY•  As  you  know,  a  , 
'  ' 
large proportion of Soviet  expor·ts  consists of ravl materials,  the  production~-
of which  is not  easily increased and which are particularly sensitive  r 
1-· 
to the ups and doHns  of the busi::1ess  cycle in \'lest ern countries.  Thercforn,  ' 
the obvious ans\V"er  is·  an  increase of finished products and services  in 
order to  increase earnings of  h~rd currencies.  h~ile in the  finish~d 
products  sector the Russians have not  been particularly succensful  due 
to problems about :neeting l!testcrn demand  and product  quality standards, 
they have been singularly successful  in the provision of shipping 
services.  It is difficult to quantify the foreign  exchange  inco;::e  of the 
Soviet fleet,  since no  official  USSR  statistics are available on thin 
subject; but western shipping circles estimate Soviet  foreign  exchange 
income  from  shipping at about  600  raillion dollars  in 1976.  This is a 
me.jor  contribution to their balance  of pvyr.1ents. 
What,  then,  makes  the Soviets  so  successful  in merch;mt  shippi!:(~·? 
Well,  fer one thing the Soviets lmm·r  hO'iv  to exploit Hestern  econorr:l.c 
frccdonn  for  t!~oir mm  end~;  t·rhile  dcn:,rin;:  :rcciproc::~.l  ric;hts  t.o  onr 
~:estern companies.  J.roreoYer,  ;·.'E·stcrn  shipp:i_ng  cormistc of :tundre.:Js  of 
individual,  indcpenc1:J.:.1t  corr:panien,  all- compe-ting 1dth  each  ot:hcr  c:.nd 
facine On  the other Side 0!1C  bU.g'o;>  St<tte-supported  Orgrmizntion.  'JhUG 1  t 
while  a  \·:estern  cor:.pany  rm..:.st  be profitable in or(ler to  meet  its 
current  and repl.:;.ocmcnt  costs,  c  Russic!1  shippine  comp~ny doed1' t  '·  i 
~ 
' 
have  such worries.  A  large share of the  co::::ts  1·1hich  a  wcst<nn  company 
depreciation,  are covered by the state.  And  tha.nke  to the al;scncc of 
~; 
t'  r 
L'T'J.St  absorb itsdf  1  ir~surance,  social ovc:::-hcnd  costs  D.nd 
lal:.our unions,  Russian  ceamcn arc reported to earn 
; 
l 
t·  about  120 dollars  a  month,  v:hile a  \'iestC'rn  seaman  me.kes  five  ti1::cs that 
much. 
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In these  circUP1ctance!';  it \·lOuld  be na.ive to  expect  ihat  co: who:·.r  , 
our open western econor.lit,;  system.  ;:ould let the !lio:r·e  efficient/ cor-:i::1ni r·r::  t' 
1C1 hu·  {~ b:;  , 
m.trv5.vP..  On  the contrnry,  the 1d.r.ner  in this  ecoi,omic  game  j fl<•lrcDdy  ~ 
c  .. (·'iC.!  .. ;.j~{lCfl  bof()f'~  i:!lc  l:':"itr.h  L::s  r:t~.._:cted.  rf!"lc  t~cti.c~  tt~cc:  to  enr~U!"'C  ~-
c ~--0""  ..  ~.·.-.·-·.·.-.·.·r~.c.c  O.te- t'r'.u.l'r  Yl:O.tl'o.,..,,8.l  t·r~<1-.-:- bv  rt--:.-L"'-tr<>r1~l.J'~  CO'l'"·<-,-..;,,c;  .,·.·J  ·:··,,.-.  ~:  ...  '  -·-- "- "'·L'""  ,,  ~  ,_..,,_  c;.,u.J.  c:.  ....  ,~ "1/i(':~"v~.:..~;;· {t:r  :~'\  f' 
dccired pcnetrat  ion of He stern crosB-tr.:-,<J.es  are  cir.ml e  'bu1 'hir.;hly  eff.-;cj~ i '-' ~- 1'  .  •  ,...,  l.•  ~ 
In  tl~e'ir  n~:.t iOJ!D-l  t:::·orle:::  there  is close  c.:oordim:ti or.  r.".tv<ccn  the  r:t:-;tc. 
;I 
c.::o:nor-t/i::;llort  r::onopolicz  mid  th:-:  ctaic  chipp-Lne  cor:1r.ani.c:::.  Priority i::: 
0ivcn to shippir..;  lcun3ia.n  f'orei1I.n  tr<::.de  in Hus;:;i::m  d1ip::;.  Sccor'J  1.!1  1L:c 
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are the  CO!{BCON  partners and  last the other companies.  All  this is 
coordinated by a  central freighting bureau  1-1ith  headqtlarters  i.n  Mosco\·;. 
With  developing countries the Russians like to  conclude bilateral agreements 
based on  50  :  50  cargo  sharing provisions.  A subtler method  is uced  in 
trades t·lith western countries:  there the  Russians buy  FOB  n.nd  ~;ell  CIF, 
which gives them  complete  dominance  over the transport  part of the 
transaction.  In the  economically more  important  and profitable crosc-trndcs, 
of course,  these methods would not  -vmrk.  .Additionally,  entry into those 
markets  is more difficult because a  good  deal of them are scrveclfhy l i iler 
COl1  C!'C!1CCG 
conferences.  This is no  problem in the relatively looRely-knit/operating 
to and  from  the United States,  but  in other parts of the 1·:orld it mr..y  YlOt 
be  easy to gain,  as a  ncHcomer,  rights to become  a  conference 1:wmhcr  n."'ld  to 
participate in its traffic.  The  Ru.ssia.'rl  solution to the problem  in a  classic 
capitalist o:r.e.  They first operate outside the conference  system, 
heavily ur,dcrcutting conference rates end also the rntes of other  .,.w~;tcr.n 
outsiders,  in order to gain a  share of the market.  The undcrcuttinc;  cc.n 
be general or nelective depending on the trtdl.e  involved.  In  particul~r 
cases  RuGsian  quotatior.s are up to  50';0  'teloH  cor;~:;:x:.ratlc  1-1cctern  freit;iJ.t 
r~tcs,  on the avcr<:tco  they nre 3bont 15  to  2crj..  belm·1.  I  mentioned alr·eDC.y 
tbat thoy nlco like to  nkim  off the high-paying cargos and leave the rest 
to the conferences.  flnr.:e  a  firr:.  positio!1  is establici1ecl  in  a  cnecific tr·;_:df' 1 
conferences are  accc 1~tcC as  a  price-lcc.dr:r \:'hich  Rur;sian  Ghipping  co:n;;::mie:s 
folloH  clocoly by  m.:-d.niaining  a  certain percentage differentiaL  Since 
G.efcncc  oco.surco of the lir,cr  conferc:r:cer.:  simpl~r 1:-.y  tl'uotil1&  even lo:-rc:r 
tariffs,  it is evident that Hedcrn shippine companies  can hardly fiC)it 
back at  col7:m~rcio1 level.  In  nome  tr.s.dcs,  such as the Europe-East Africnn 
or Europe-!Torth .American trades,  the  Rli.Gsi.an::::  arc not  only a  threat to ttc 
conference  sysfem tut they are also  slo·dy erodint:; the  economic  hec:.l t!1  of 
shipping companies.  The  situn.tion is bound to bccone l7Cr:>e  once all the 
spcr;ialised tox1nage  r.ou  being built  iG  seeking err.plo;yTn.ent  in the  intern~'.tic~c:.: 
trades. 
From  the po.Lnt  of vie-v:  of the \-/estern  shipper - as  opposed to 
rhi~-.c;-;ncr  - it cou1~i,  of coiJ.rso,  'be  <Tp~.:.d  th::::t  cor;-poti. tion hc1p.s  kcop 
frcic;ht  ro.tes  dm·m  c::r:d  provjdr;s  the  shipper -vd:th  a  genuine  <Jltcrn.::!.tiv,)  J::c<'.n~ 
of  trm~sport. IJ'he  pr.cncr:~m::.:,l  succc!>S  of the  Hu:::sier£sho~·rs that  rn~YJ;r  nhip;:>e1·r. 
must  take that attituclc,  at lcact  in the short  tcr:n.  :nut  shipp(.'rs  <:.rc 
cle:.1rly  a~ concerned as  shipoHnc,rs  a1:::out  the long term  implications of 
Russian  cor:.petition.  'l'h:!..s  Has  clc::1o:nstratcd  during  ::1.  joir.t  conforcr:ce • 
I 
; 
• 
1- .. 
• 
of European  shippers'  councils and  shipowners held  i!l S\·titzcrland last year, 
tzhen  a  joint declaration \-laS  issued warning that continued  COl'.lECOI'T 
penetration of l·Iestern trades could result  in the long run  in destruction 
of the  confer~~ce system,  serious deterioration in the quality of shippine 
services,  and restriction of freedom  of choice among alternative shipping 
services. 
This is already part of the ans\·Ier to the third question  I 
posed at the beginning:  l·:hy  should  -v:e  be concerned about this bdJ  c1  up 
of Russian  shipping competition?  There are other reasons too.  Obviously 
the huge Soviet merchnnt fleet  can become  a.  seellrity risk for the Hest 
in times of instability e.ny.rhere  in the \-:orld.  Paradoxically,  thif.:  fleet 
is nourished by our  o~m international trade.  !·1orcovcr,  an  ever-grm•inc 
Russian fleet l·:hich  is completely removed.  from  our influence threatens the· 
economic health of our shipping companies and can ma.'!(e  international 
seaborne trade rr.ore  and  more  depcnda.Jlt  on non-tvestern  shippine  ser\Ticc~. 
Th'ts  would bring us into undesirable  economic dependency and would  make  us 
very vulnerable to  econoraic  pressures. 
In E:pi.te  of these dangers the eo1mtrj.es of the  Euro~~eo.n Economic 
may  be necessary in tr.e  face of Soviet  a.~d other  COI.TECOJ:T  co>mtry j)c:trtic:i.-
po.tion in our  international trz.cle.  There has  be::en  a  tcndc::ncy to think 
th~.t  thE>::::e  count.:des Hould  r.omehoi-1  bdJc.ve according to our rules of 
·the  game  if only He held on to  them  tE:naciously.  But  I  thirJ: it uill 
be necessary for us to establish via-a-vis the  ntute trc.ding  com:tric•n 
a  nmv  set of rules of the garne  taking into account  their cconor::ic  r::;;~tcw 
and not  ignoring it. 
Firat stepc have  alrP.<:1dy  been to.ken.  Some  of the  l~cmbc:r  St~:~os 
of the Co:rlffiunity  most  hit by Soviet  competition have tried to  rJe,;oti<:·:~c 
satisfactory <1rrc::.neei.1cnts  bilaterally.  'Ibis approach  is stiJ.l being p·v.rr.:·..:ccJ., 
but  experience  so  far :Cms  been di::appointing.  'I'hin  is not  very surprisinG, 
because the Russians  sunpect that  a.  single country -vmuld  hn.ve  difficulty in 
in~)l  c!:'":ct1t inc lll1 il~:t  crc-ll  clef  e!1si  ·vo 
traffic to  it:::  nei.:.;hl•ourr::.  'l'his  is  r.o  <loubt  the b0-r:ic  reason  v:':~·  t!:•c;  V)'-~'"~'. 
r.:c~:sureG  pow~rr. ;;h i.ch  exint  in n.l most  every I:cml;cr  State of the  Co:.1r:nll1.:·:.y 
have never·  yet  lx~cn n.pplir:d  i.o  thc1~1.  Of  courr.:c,  the  Ru.£cio.nG  arc eFD.rc  of 
this  ~·1cakne:::;s of Europenn  c01~ntric:;;.  J.:inistcrs  fron1  Corm::unity  countr5.os  b·:..ve 
returned from vidts to  I.:osco•.:  ~:ith the clear  improssion that the  Ru:::si:- .• n:::: 
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Face~ with this situation,  the Council of !~inintcrs of the Com.·nu.nity  • 
has decided that  a  serious examination must  now  be made  of the scope  for  f 
'  taking action not  only at national but  also at  Community  level,  and  in  L 
~ 
•  association where possible with other like-minded countries.  In response  t0 t 
a  request  by the Council  of Ministers the Commission's  services prepared las-t; 
autumn  a  \vorking paper on  ohippine; competition by East  European state-
trading countries,  vlhich  analyzed the situation and its implications and 
reviewed alternatives for  common  action at  Community level.  The  options 
considered  include:  i· 
A  Community message to Eastern bloc countries spell  ir!g out  EEC  concer!1 
and  suggested principles for the orderly development  of  maritir.~e  trad~: 
Imposition of FOB  terms  of shipment  on  Co~nrm.mity imports; 
Limitations on the right of establishment of Eastern bloc  shipping  .. 
agencies in CommunitY.  !·:em1::er  States; 
Imposition of a  levy on the freiel:t  rate charged on  imports dL::chcrgcd 
by &.stern bloc shipping companies operating outside conferences; 
Rcffl.llation of Eantcrn bloc freit;ht  ratcz; 
Introduction of quota rc£trictions on  sailir:e;s and landines  of carc;o: 
Coordination of the ""pplicatio:n of Member  States'  counter-:neasure 
pc~·:ers. 
The  Co:nmi ssion  1 s  services  1  p<.tper  \-JaS  intended. to !'rovide  a  basis for 
discussion in the frameHork of the Cot:ncil  of r.:i:nisters;  The  Com;r:ission 
did not  pron01mcc  its0lf  firr:~ly  j.n  favour of any of the optjons  rl·V:ic·.~·ed. 
The  Commissh-.n  r.-:ud  firr>t  discuss this complex  prol;lera furthsr  •.-:i th the 
!~!ember States and  in doing  so  the possible  implications of a  co":lr::on 
defen~ive strat.e&y in shipping on trade and  forei{~ policy must  be 
carefully assessed. 
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~  The  Council of Ministers had already reacted favour-ably to t;w  J 
Commis~ion  1 s  services  1  report  and  asked it to present to the Council  cor.c:::-• i 
'  proposals for action by spring 1978.  At  present  \'Je  are '1-lorking  on  tr.ese.  J 
want  to  emphasize,  however,  that neither the Commission  nor the ::e:r.·ber 
States want  to provoke  a  confrontation '"i th the Soviet Union or its 
fellow  COMECON  members,  nor do  we  l-fant  to  exclude them from our trades. 
All we  want is to put· our defences  in order and to coordinate  the~n '.-:hUe 
still expecting that negotiations \·Iill  ultimately lead to a  solution of 
our problem&.  But  we  want  to negotiate from  a  position of  streng-~h,  ar.d 
~. 
in er>tablishing this position it seems· to me  that the Community ho.s  an  , 
important part to play. 
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